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Abstract We examine whether and under what circumstances World Bank and
International Monetary Fund ~IMF! programs affect the likelihood of major govern-
ment crises+We find that crises are, on average, more likely as a consequence of World
Bank programs+ We also find that governments face an increasing risk of entering a
crisis when they remain under an IMF or World Bank arrangement once the economy’s
performance improves+ The international financial institution’s ~IFI! scapegoat func-
tion thus seems to lose its value when the need for financial support is less urgent+
While the probability of a crisis increases when a government turns to the IFIs, pro-
grams inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis+
This is in line with two interpretations+ First, the conclusion of IFI programs can sig-
nal the government’s incompetence, and second, governments that inherit programs
might be less likely to implement program conditions agreed to by their predecessors+
There is substantial anecdotal evidence that structural adjustment programs by the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ~IMF! face severe resistance
from groups in society that fear the negative consequences of the programs+1 In
some cases IMF and World Bank programs have led to government crises, cabinet
changes, or the replacement of entire governments+ However, there are also coun-
tries in which the implementation of adjustment programs did not result in major
political turmoil+ What are the circumstances under which IMF and World Bank
programs harm the governments of the program countries, and when is it that inter-
national financial institutions ~IFIs! do not cause government crises? While sev-
eral studies allude to empirical evidence showing that IMF programs affect survival
rates of political leaders,2 this question has yet to be properly investigated+
We thank Richard Jong-A-Pin for contributions to an earlier draft of this article as well as James
Vreeland, seminar participants at Yale University, the University of Birmingham, the First Conference
on the Political Economy of International Organizations ~Monte Verità, 2008!, the 2008 conference of
the Research Committee Development Economics of the German Economic Association and the review-
ers of this journal for helpful comments, and Stefanie Walter and Thomas Sattler for providing their
data on fixed exchange rate collapses+ We thank Scott Jobson for proofreading+ Supplemental material
for this article can be found at www+journals+cambridge+org0ino2012007+
1+ For an extensive list of IMF- and World Bank–induced riots, see Caffentzis and Federici 2001+
2+ See, for example, Killick 1995; Smith and Vreeland 2006; and Dreher 2004+
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The question’s answer could guide governments on the verge of concluding IMF
and World Bank programs+ The answer might also help IFIs design their programs
in a way that does not harm program countries’ governments+ To some extent,
knowing the circumstances leading to government crises also sheds light on the
IFIs’ “scapegoat” function+3 Can governments blame the IFIs for unpopular poli-
cies and thereby reduce the risk of crises? Or do citizens blame their government
for the IFIs’ presence and respond with riots and demonstrations, leading to gov-
ernment crises?
We first examine whether the implementation of IMF and World Bank pro-
grams on average induces government crises+ Next, we investigate the circum-
stances that yield negative outcomes and separate those from cases in which the
IMF and World Bank did not hurt—or even helped—the governments+ We find
that World Bank programs significantly increase crisis probability, on average+We
also find that governments face an increasing risk of entering a crisis when they
remain under an IMF or World Bank program once the economy improves+ While
crisis probability rises when a government turns to the IFIs, programs inherited by
preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis+ These results are
in line with two explanations, with rather different policy implications+ First, insta-
bility might increase because program terms are onerous and damage the econ-
omy, thereby creating a situation that threatens government survival+4 Second, crises
might occur because the program reveals the poor quality of government policies+
The explanation is suggested by a signaling model5—the conclusion of IFI pro-
grams can signal the government’s incompetence in certain situations+ This is
because competent politicians do not have to turn to the IFIs for credit when the
economy performs moderately poor, while incompetent governments do+
The Hypotheses
The record of IMF and World Bank programs cannot be considered fully success-
ful+6 It is therefore no surprise that the political costs of negotiating IMF and World
Bank programs can be substantial+7 There are a number of ways in which the IFIs’
programs may influence policies and outcomes in the recipient country, thereby
affecting the probability of government crises+ The IFIs are frequently accused of
3+ Vreeland 1999+
4+ However, we also observe that inherited programs do not hurt the government+ If governments
that inherit programs are less likely to implement program conditions agreed to by their predecessors
~or the IFIs are less likely to insist on implementation!, inherited programs could be less damaging to
governments+
5+ Dreher 2004+
6+ See, for example, Vreeland 2003 and 2006; Steinwand and Stone 2008; and Marchesi and Sirtori
2011+
7+ Vreeland 1999+ For a recent analysis on what determines the size of IMF loans see Moser and
Sturm 2011+
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imposing conditions that imply market-oriented policies+ For example, a frequent
condition for World Bank adjustment lending is the reduction of price distortions
or the elimination of subsidies+8 The IMF usually asks for restrictive fiscal and
monetary policy, currency devaluations, and the reduction of subsidies+ While the
implementation of these conditions might be beneficial for long-run economic
growth, such policies can hurt a large number of people in the short term+ Even
when the majority of a government endorses the program and is willing to imple-
ment the policies, other parts of the government might see their constituents being
hurt by the programs and therefore refuse the IFIs’ conditionality in order to pro-
tect their constituencies and increase their popularity+ This can give rise to dissent
among the government+ Some groups of the government coalition might threaten
to leave, potentially inducing a political crisis+ There is ample anecdotal evidence
showing that IMF and World Bank conditions have provoked protests, occasion-
ally leading to government crises+
However, conditionality can also reduce the risk of a crisis+ It can change polit-
ical power constellations+ This is likely to be true both within government and for
parties among the parliament in general+ Within the government, it is well docu-
mented that finance and economy ministers’ positions are strengthened vis-à-vis
the spending ministries+9 The minister of finance is usually more interested in restric-
tive fiscal policies compared to the spending ministries+10 In times of economic
hardship, this will likely lead to tensions within the government, increasing the
risk of crises+ To the extent that the IFIs’ conditions tie the disbursements of their
money to restrictive policies, the finance minister can use them as a scapegoat for
such policies+ This strengthens this official’s position and might prevent a crisis+11
The IFIs’ scapegoat function can also help in securing power for the govern-
ment+12 Consider the example of Brazil+ In 1998 President Fernando Cardoso nego-
tiated an IMF arrangement despite the ample availability of foreign reserves+ The
Cardoso government favored substantially restructuring the government’s budget
which faced severe opposition, even within its own coalition+13 By tying his poli-
cies to the IMF program, Cardoso was able to overcome domestic opposition+ As
Cardoso put it, “The whole world is watching us, watching to see if we’ll be able
to resolve the crisis+”14 By tying their hands to the IFIs’ program, a government in
favor of restrictive policies can thus overcome resistance and hence reduce the
probability of a political crisis+
Another channel through which the IFIs can affect political crises is the funds
associated with their programs+ Ideally, conditionality prevents abuse of the loans,
8+ For example, World Bank 2005+
9+ Buira 2002+
10+ Eslava 2006+
11+ Vreeland 1999+
12+ See ibid+; and Smith and Vreeland 2006+
13+ Vreeland 1999+
14+ Associated Press, 5 November 1998, cited in Vreeland 1999, 2+
Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? 331
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000094
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:31:09, subject to the Cambridge Core
so that the loans can be used to alleviate economic hardship+ The World Bank’s
Structural Adjustment Loans can provide governments with the money they need
for the temporary financing of restructuring measures+ The IMF can provide inter-
national reserves to pay for imports that are required for domestic production+
This should reduce the risk of a government crisis+
However, when conditionality fails, IMF and World Bank loans increase a
government’s leeway, potentially reducing the IFIs’ role as a scapegoat+ If the
increased leeway is used to postpone necessary reforms, a government crisis might
be deferred but could still eventually hit even harder+ The probability of a crisis
would then increase with loan size+ On the other hand, without effective condi-
tionality the loans could be directly used by national governments to secure power+15
Loans from the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment ~IBRD! are significantly larger in preelection periods, facilitating the gener-
ation of political business cycles+16 We assume that governments make use of the
IFIs’ money to secure their power not only at election time, but whenever they
deem it necessary+ To the extent that support gained with the help of IFI credit
outweighs the loss of support due to program implementation, the likelihood of a
government crisis is reduced+
Based on these considerations, the direction of IMF and World Bank programs
or loans on the probability of crises is not a priori obvious+ However, the effect of
IMF and World Bank programs is likely to depend on the circumstances under
which a program came into effect+17 The argument can be demonstrated in a sig-
naling model+18 According to the model, the IFIs’ programs can help citizens to
“read” the “type” of their government under certain circumstances+ The model
assumes that competent politicians do not have to turn to the IFIs if the economy
performs moderately, but incompetent governments do+ Competent politicians can
thus highlight their competence by borrowing from the market or other countries,
while incompetent politicians borrow from the IFIs, thereby signaling their incom-
petence+ Arguably, domestic support for the government is likely to suffer once
incompetence becomes apparent, potentially giving rise to government crises+ An
empirical test of the model shows that governments concluding IMF arrange-
ments prior to a national election generally increase their reelection probability+19
However, this increased probability of reelection following the conclusion of pro-
grams decreases in the face of rising GDP growth+ IMF and World Bank programs
might thus indicate the incumbent’s quality: when growth rates are low, voters
accept the necessity of the IFIs’ involvement+ In a good economic environment,
however, only incompetent governments need their assistance—they consequently
lose office in the next election+
15+ Dreher and Vaubel 2004+
16+ Ibid+
17+ Smith and Vreeland 2006+
18+ Dreher 2004+
19+ Ibid+
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Arguably, the effect of IMF and World Bank involvement on government crises
is also likely to depend on the program’s success and the economy’s development+
For our purposes, it does not matter whether, and to what extent, the IFIs caused
such development+ An increase in economic growth for example, may be attrib-
uted to the IFIs’ programs regardless of whether these programs actually caused
growth+When a program turns out to be successful, people might be more inclined
to accept short-term losses for expected future benefits+ The probability of enter-
ing a crisis should thus decrease+
Government survival might not be in danger if IMF programs are already in
effect when the current government comes to power+20 In this case, citizens do not
blame their government for the program’s existence+As Smith and Vreeland argue,
the incumbent government can use the IMF as a scapegoat given that it is not
directly responsible for the program+ Consequently, resistance to the government,
and thus instability, decreases+ However, when the economy performs well, the
IFIs’ scapegoat function can lose its significance+ The threat of terminating the
programs is not as binding for opposing views in or outside the government as it
is in harder times+ On the contrary, when the economy performs badly, opponents
of the current policy stance are more likely to accept some economic hardship+
The IFIs’ policy conditions will then continue to reduce the probability of govern-
ment crises+ In light of the signaling model, inherited programs might not be use-
ful in “reading” the current government’s competence+ Even competent governments
might stick with the programs if the economy performs badly+ If economic perfor-
mance improves, however, citizens might take the persistence of the program as a
signal of their government’s incompetence+
We derive two hypotheses from this discussion:
H1: The effect of IMF and World Bank involvement on crisis probability depends
on the state of the economy.
H2: The effect of IMF and World Bank programs on crisis probability depends on
whether the current government turned to the IFIs itself, or inherited the program.
In testing these two hypotheses, we can potentially discriminate between alterna-
tive channels that link IFI programs to government crises+ If we find evidence that
programs do not hurt governments when they are economically successful this
would imply that voters might be willing to accept short-term hardship for longer-
term benefits+ If we find it does hurt governments, such evidence would be in line
with the argument that IFI programs can be used by voters to infer the compe-
tence of politicians+21 Evidence in line with H2 would provide further support for
the signaling model+
20+ Smith and Vreeland 2006+
21+ Dreher 2004+
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Method and Data
The IFI’s presence in a country has quite a diversity of effects on crisis proba-
bility and it seems difficult to find equivalents for them in terms of observable
variables+ We follow Boockmann and Dreher who suggest the number of pro-
grams in operation as a proxy measuring the pressure for reforms+22 This is due
to either the direct effect of conditionality on policies, or the transfer of knowl-
edge and advice, which increases with the number of contacts between a recipi-
ent country and the IMF or World Bank+ We would like to measure contacts
directly to distinguish between conditionality, transfer of knowledge, or other infor-
mal effects, but we lack the data to do so+ To capture the softening of the budget
constraint, it is necessary to include financial variables+ In principle, the amount
of IMF or World Bank credit a country receives may also proxy the direct effect
of conditionality on national policies+ However, conditions and credit volumes
need not be proportional, and some conditions are included in almost all pro-
grams+23 Thus, the number of arrangements concluded may be a better measure
for IFI conditionality than the flow of finances+ Controlling for the programs in
operation, the amount of credit should be insignificant if there is no effect of the
softening of the budget constraint, should increase the probability of a crisis if
reforms are postponed as a consequence of the softening of the budget con-
straint, or should reduce the risk of crisis if the money is directly used to main-
tain power+
We employ seven variables indicating IMF and World Bank involvement in a
country+ We use dummy variables that are equal to 1, if an IMF program has been
in effect for at least five months of a certain year, and 0 otherwise+ One dummy
includes programs under the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility and Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility ~SAF0PRGF! and a second includes programs under
its Stand-by Arrangement ~SBA!+24 We use a similar variable for the World Bank,
counting the number of loans given for structural adjustment in effect for at least
five months in a certain year, according to the definition from the World Bank’s
web page+25 While countries can have only one IMF program operating at a time
under the facilities covered here, the maximum number of World Bank structural
adjustment programs among the countries in our sample is seven ~Bangladesh in
1989 and Argentina in 1998 and 1999!+ To measure the effect of the IFIs’ loans we
22+ Boockmann and Dreher 2003+
23+ According to Marchesi, Sabani, and Dreher 2011, IMF credits disbursed reduce rather than
increase the number of conditions in a program+ Higher loans do not seem to come with tougher con-
ditionality+ This result is in line with Drazen 2002, showing that fewer conditions are required for
larger loans, since the government will find it easier to remunerate lobbies and veto players in exchange
for reforms with larger loans+
24+ We use these facilities separately rather than jointly and let the data decide on whether or not
their effect on crises is the same+
25+ Available at ^www+worldbank+org0projects0&, accessed 15 October 2011+
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use gross disbursements as a percentage of GDP+26 Regarding the IMF, we again
distinguish flows under the SAF0PRGF from those of the SBA+ For the World
Bank, disbursement data on structural adjustment loans are not available+We there-
fore use disbursements from the IBRD and—separately—the International Devel-
opment Agency ~IDA!+27
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis+ Our annual data
cover the 1970–2002 period and extend to a maximum of 132 developing coun-
tries+28 Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel
data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of
explanatory variables+29 Our dependent variable is a dummy, taking the value of 1
in the case of at least one major government crisis having occurred and 0 other-
wise+ A major government crisis is defined as “any rapidly developing situation
that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime, excluding situations of
revolt aimed at such overthrow+”30 The variable is frequently used as a measure of
instability in the empirical literature+31
To estimate the impact of World Bank and IMF programs on the probability of
major government crises, we use a conditional fixed-effects logit model including
three cubic splines along with a count variable for the number of years since the
last major government crisis to correct for temporal dependence+32
As a potential problem, IMF and World Bank programs might be triggered by
the same set of underlying factors that also trigger a government crisis+ When we
fail to explicitly control for these factors, our results might reflect some common
cause interdependency and would as such be spurious+ IMF and World Bank pro-
grams might even be directly affected by government crises+ It needs to be noted,
however, that endogeneity is likely to bias the estimated effect of IMF and World
Bank programs downward+ Arguably, demand for programs is lower when gov-
ernments expect them to lead to a political crisis+ Along the same lines, supply
of IMF and World Bank money will be lower if there is government instability,
since we would expect compliance with the IFIs’ conditionality to be lower when
the government that signed the contract loses office+ The estimated coefficients
are thus likely to represent the lower bound of the IFIs’ impact on government
crises+
26+ The sources are the IMF’s web page on country information ^www+imf+org0external0country0&,
and annual reports ^http:00www+imf+org0external0pubs0ft0ar0index+htm&, for the IMF’s disburse-
ments; and the Global Development Finance database ^http:00data+worldbank+org0data-catalog0global-
development-finance&, for the World Bank’s disbursements; while gross domestic product ~GDP! data
are taken from World Bank 2006+ Websites accessed 1 November 2011+
27+ We test for the robustness of our results using commitment data on structural adjustment loans+
The results are unaffected+
28+ We omit industrialized countries that have never received IMF or World Bank loans+
29+ All variables, their precise definitions, data sources, and summary statistics are listed in Appen-
dixes 1 and 2+
30+ The source is Databanks International 2005+
31+ For example, Broz 2002+
32+ Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998+
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Addressing the potential endogeneity problem formally, we use two strategies+
First, we use maximum likelihood instrumental variables probit techniques with
standard errors clustered at the country level+ As our first instrument we use a
country’s voting behavior in the United Nations ~UN! General Assembly, which is
a standard measure employed in the recent literature+ The empirical literature regard-
ing political influences on the IFIs shows that developing countries get better terms
from the IFIs when they have closer ties with the United States, as measured by
their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly+33 We code votes in agreement
as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and divide by the total number of votes in a
particular year+34 Arguably, although related to the probability of receiving money
from the World Bank and IMF, UN General Assembly voting is unlikely to be
correlated with government crises directly+As a second instrument we propose the
debt-to-GDP ratio, calculated as the share of public and publicly guaranteed debt
in GDP+35 Obviously, debt increases the probability that a government turns to the
IFIs+36 However because the debt-to-GDP ratio is not a direct determinant of gov-
ernment crises, it is a suitable instrument+37 This is also reflected in the simple
correlation between debt and crises that is almost zero in our sample+ As an alter-
native to the IV probit, we replicate the analysis using a dynamic panel general-
ized method of moments ~GMM! approach+38
Empirical Results
We replicate the analysis of Gassebner and Jong-A-Pin, adding our variables of
interest to their model+39 Using a general-to-specific approach and extreme bounds
analysis, they examine which variables are robustly related to major government
crises+ These robust variables are: the type of political regime and its duration,
several ~logged! variables proxying for political violence ~guerilla warfare, assas-
sinations, and purges!, and mass civil protest ~demonstrations, riots, and general
strikes! as well as economic growth per capita+ Given the large number of addi-
tional, potentially important variables they tested, we can be reasonably confident
that our model does not suffer from omitted variables bias+40
33+ See, for example, Kilby 2009 and 2011+
34+ We follow Dreher and Sturm 2012, in constructing a variable reflecting the average vote of the
Group of 7 ~G7! countries, then weighting each G7 country’s vote with its quota in the IMF to take its
voting weight in the international organization into account+ We discard abstentions and absences+
35+ The source is World Bank 2006+
36+ For example, Marchesi and Sabani 2007+
37+ Gassebner and Jong-A-Pin 2007+
38+ As a way of minimizing the number of instruments in the regressions, we collapse the matrix of
instruments+ The Hansen test and Arellano-Bond test do not reject our model+
39+ Gassebner and Jong-A-Pin 2007+
40+ Ibid+ Note that we control for inflation, international reserves, and the current account balance
below+ We also included official development aid ~as a percentage of GDP!, GDP per capita, and a
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Specifications 1 to 7 of Table 1 test for the effect of the IMF and World Bank
variables using conditional fixed-effects logit+ Column ~1! includes the number of
World Bank programs, while column ~2! includes IMF Structural Adjustment
Facility0Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility ~SAF0PRGF! and SBA programs
for the whole sample period+ We should note, however, that the IMF’s SAF was
created in 1986, so the observations prior to 1986 are all set to 0 here+ In column
~3!, we show the same specification restricted to the 1986 to 2002 period+ Col-
umns ~4! and ~5! replicate these specifications, including the IMF and World Bank
variables jointly rather than separately+ In columns ~6! and ~7!, we add gross dis-
bursements to the program variables+
The results suggest that major government crises are more likely in more dem-
ocratic political systems+ Parties in such systems can easily express their opinion
on controversial policies and events that may ultimately trigger a crisis+ We find
crises to be significantly more likely when mass civil protest and political vio-
lence exists, represented by the highly significant coefficients of demonstrations
and purges ~while the coefficients of riots, strikes, assassinations, regime duration,
and guerilla warfare are not robustly significant at conventional levels!+ More-
over, economic growth in the previous year reduces the likelihood of a govern-
ment crisis, at the 1 percent level of significance+
Turning to our variables of interest, the probability of government crises is
strongly affected by World Bank programs+ According to column ~1!, World
Bank programs increase the probability of a crisis at the 1 percent level of
significance+ The corresponding marginal effect implies that each World
Bank structural loan received in the previous year increases the probability
of a major government crisis by 5+4 percent+41 The coefficient remains similar
in magnitude in columns ~4! and ~5!, remaining significant at the 5 percent
level when IMF programs are also included in the full sample, and at the 10
percent level when the sample is restricted to the 1986 to 2002 period+ Com-
pared to the quantitative effect of a World Bank project, the effect of an SAF0
PRGF program seems to be even larger+ According to column ~2!, the estimated
coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level, while the corresponding mar-
ginal effect suggests that an SAF0PRGF program in the previous year
increases the probability of a major government crisis by 15+1 percent+ The effect
of Stand-by Arrangements is not significant at conventional levels, and signifi-
cantly smaller compared to the effect of the IMF’s concessional loans ~at the 10
percent level!+42
dummy for currency crises+ The coefficients of the additional variables are not significant at conven-
tional levels and our results of interest are unchanged+
41+ All marginal effects are estimated at the mean of all explanatory variables, setting the fixed
effects to 0+
42+ Note that the coefficient becomes marginally significant in column ~3!+ However, the coefficient
remains significantly smaller compared to those of SAF0PRGF programs and is not robust to the inclu-
sion of the disbursement variables+
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When including the IMF and World Bank variables in tandem ~column 4!, the
corresponding marginal effects change to a probability increase of 4+3 percent for
a World Bank project and 12+2 percent for an SAF0PRGF program+ When includ-
ing gross disbursements, the program variables are significant at the 10 percent
level at least in the full sample ~column 6!+ While the coefficient of World Bank
programs becomes marginally insignificant in column ~7! ~p-value 0+109!, the coef-
ficient remains very similar when compared to column ~6!+ Gross disbursements
are not significant at conventional levels in either specification, however+ Our results
therefore show that conditionality and advice seem to be more important than loan
size in affecting government crises+ On average, the effect of restrictive policies
prescribed by the IFIs seems to outweigh the effects of the stronger position of the
finance minister and the “scapegoating” effect+
Columns ~8! to ~10! in Table 2 show the results of the IV probit estimations+
Although we would like to include the IMF and World Bank variables in the same
specification, we have only two instruments for three potentially endogenous vari-
ables, so we are forced to use the IFI variables separately+ For the same reason,
we cannot include gross disbursements in addition to the program variables+43 Note
here, that our instruments are not rejected; the test for overidentification shows
that they are uncorrelated with the error term ~but it can be conducted in only the
World Bank specification given that there is no overidentification with the two
separate program variables for the IMF!+ Finally, our instruments are not weak
either—the first stage F-value easily exceeds the critical threshold of 10+44
The results for the World Bank are confirmed+ After controlling for potential
endogeneity, World Bank programs trigger major government crises+ The magni-
tude of the effect is comparable with the conditional fixed-effects logit setup: an
additional World Bank program increases the likelihood of a crisis by 6+8 percent
~column 8!+ However, the coefficients of the IMF’s ~SAF0PRGF and SBA! pro-
grams are not significant at conventional levels in any of the additional regressions+
Columns ~11! to ~14! in Table 2 report the results obtained by employing the
GMM estimator+ One drawback of this setup is that the resulting coefficients can
no longer be interpreted as probabilities+ Note that the lagged dependent variable
is significant at the 1 percent level, with a positive coefficient confirming our
findings from the temporal dependence setup+ Column ~11! shows the overall sam-
ple, excluding disbursements+ In column ~12!, we restrict the sample to the 1986
to 2002 period+ Columns ~13! and ~14! replicate these regressions including
disbursements+
The results show that the number of crises increases with the number of World
Bank programs, at least at the 10 percent level of significance+ The IMF program
dummies, however, are insignificant at conventional levels+ Gross disbursements
43+ When we include disbursements instead of programs the coefficients are not significant at con-
ventional levels+
44+ Staiger and Stock 1997+
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are also not significantly related to government crises in any specification+45 Fol-
lowing the interpretation of Boockmann and Dreher outlined earlier, controlling
for the amount of money, the existence of the program itself is likely to reflect
conditions and advice+ The effect of the World Bank therefore seems to be more
related to conditions and advice than moral hazard+
We next turn to testing our two hypotheses+ In order to test H1, we replicate the
analysis including proxies for the contemporary state of the economy+ We thereby
assume that people judge the role of the IFIs based on recent economic develop-
ments and their interactions with IMF and World Bank programs+We focus on the
IMF’s SAF0PRGF programs and programs by the World Bank given the insigni-
ficance of the IMF’s Stand-by Arrangements and the disbursement variables+46
We use the following variables: economic growth per capita, consumer price
index, current account balance, foreign reserves measured in months of imports,47
as well as the degree of IFI involvement in a country’s respective region+48 We
calculate the degree of IFI involvement by taking averages of the number of World
Bank and IMF programs being carried out in the specific geographical region of
the said country ~excluding the country under focus, so there is variation within
the regions!+49
In addition to including the state of the economy variables themselves, we add
their interaction with the IFIs’ programs ~all lagged by one year!+ Table 3 shows
the GMM estimates, where we include the proxies for the state of the economy
and their interaction with World Bank programs to the model of Table 1+50 We
also estimate the same regressions using logit+51 It is important to note, however,
that interpreting the interaction effect in nonlinear models ~such as conditional
fixed-effects logit! is not analogous to linear models+ A t-test on the coefficient of
the interaction term is not sufficient to test for the significance of the interaction+52
Since the t-statistics of the interaction terms are meaningless in the logit regres-
sions, we do not report the results in a table but calculate the derivatives with
respect to the variables of interest+
45+ Note that although we collapse the instrument matrix, the number of instruments exceeds the
number of countries in our sample+ The results have to be treated with caution+
46+ Including these variables as additional covariates or as additional interaction terms yields insig-
nificant coefficients and leaves the results reported here qualitatively unchanged+ These additional results
are available on request+
47+ The source is World Bank 2006+
48+ We have also used money and quasi money growth taken from World Bank 2006 and a dummy
for a fixed exchange rate collapse taken from Sattler and Walter 2010+ However, both variables and
their interactions with the IFIs turned out to be statistically insignificant+
49+ Specifically, we distinguish the following regions: Asia ~combining East Asia and Pacific, and
South Asia!, Europe ~that is, Europe and Central Asia!, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa+
50+ We treat the lagged dependent variable, the IFI variable, the interacted variable, and the proxy
for the state of the economy as endogenous+
51+ We do not report estimates using IV probit given that we lack proper instruments for the inter-
acted variables+
52+ See Ai and Norton 2003; and Greene 2010+
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According to the results of the logit estimations, the interaction of World Bank
programs with most of our proxies is not significant at conventional levels+ The
exception is international reserves, where the interaction effect is significant
for a substantial share of the observations+ We also conduct a likelihood-ratio test
to examine whether the fit of our model improves when including the interaction
terms with international reserves+53 Indeed, the test suggests that statistical fit
improves ~p-value  +067!+ We thus conclude that the interaction between World
Bank loans and international reserves affects the probability of government cri-
ses+ However, we are not interested in the interaction effect as such, but in
the marginal effect of a World Bank project+ Because the values of all variables
influence the marginal effect and this effect is conditional on the level of inter-
national reserves, we show the result in Figure 1+ As can be seen, for very low
reserve levels, the effect of the World Bank is not statistically different from
0+ Accordingly, in bad economic situations, World Bank programs do not
increase the probability of a government crisis+ This is in line with a potential
scapegoat function of the World Bank+ Unpopular policies can be attributed
to the World Bank when countries need its support, increasing cohesion among
the government+ If reserves are above a certain threshold ~in our case approxi-
mately 2+9 months of imports!, an additional World Bank project increases
the probability of a crisis ~at least at the 10 percent level!+ The largest mar-
ginal effect is an increase of almost 20 percent, while the average significant
effect is around 6 percent+ Consequently, the scapegoat function seems to lose
its value when reserves are sufficiently high and the need for World Bank sup-
port is less urgent+ Arguably, citizens can “read” how their government is doing
from whether or not it turns to ~or sticks with! the World Bank even though
reserves are high+ Incompetent governments lose support and crises become more
frequent+
Note that the GMM results shown in column ~5! of Table 3 support this inter-
pretation+ At the 10 percent level of significance, World Bank programs increase
the risk of a crisis when reserves are high, while international reserves in general
decrease the probability of a crisis at the 5 percent level of significance+ To cal-
culate the marginal effect of an additional project, we again have to take both the
conditioning variable ~international reserves! and the interaction term into con-
sideration+ This is not only true for the magnitude of the effect but also for the
significance level+ In accordance with our results of the conditional fixed-effects
logit setup, an additional World Bank project increases the probability of a crisis
~at the 10 percent level at least! when international reserves are greater than 2+9
months of imports+ In the GMM setup, the magnitude of this effect is much larger,
which is due to the fact that it does not represent a probability, but rather counts
the number of crises+ Hence, the marginal effect is not restricted to being less
than 1+
53+ As proposed by Greene 2010+
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The GMM estimates from Table 3 show that the result for international reserves
also holds for the current account balance+ At the 1 percent level of significance,
the interaction between World Bank programs and the current account balance
increases the probability of government crises, while the current account balance
itself is not significant at conventional levels+ The interaction term is statistically
highly significant, but the coefficient is so small that the marginal effect is virtu-
ally constant ~at 6 percent!+
Replicating the analysis for the IMF yields statistically insignificant interaction
terms according to the logit estimates+ However, as column ~3! of Table 4 shows,
the interaction between inflation and IMF programs is significant at the 10 percent
level in the GMM setup, with a negative coefficient ~with inflation itself not being
significant at conventional levels!+ The result supports our hypothesis, indicating
that the IMF’s scapegoat function has greater value during times of economic hard-
ship+ With rising inflation, government crises are less likely to arise as a conse-
quence of IMF programs+
FIGURE 1. Hypothesis 1: Government crises, World Bank, and current state of
economy
Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? 347
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In summary, there is some evidence to support H1+ The state of the economy
does have an effect on the impact of the IFIs’ programs+ However, rather than
being able to profit from potentially successful programs, governments face an
increased risk of entering a crisis if they remain under an IFI program once the
economy picks up+ Again, we also added disbursements to the regressions and
interacted disbursements with the variables measuring the state of the economy+
Given that neither the disbursement variables nor the interactions were significant
at conventional levels, we do not report them in the table+ It seems that the mere
existence of a program, rather than the actual loan size, might help citizens eval-
uate their government’s competence+
Finally, we investigate whether, and to what extent, governments can blame their
predecessors for the implementation of an IFI program, thereby avoiding the
increased risk of a crisis as a consequence of the program ~H2!+ We therefore
separate our IFI variables in two groups of arrangements+ The first group has been
negotiated by the preceding government, so that the current government cannot
fully be blamed for their existence+ The second group contains programs that the
government itself agreed to, and is thus fully responsible for+
The results of Table 5 are in line with our hypothesis+ Only programs con-
cluded by the current government affect crisis probability+54 This is true for World
Bank programs according to all specifications ~at least at the 10 percent level of
significance! and for the IMF’s SAF0PRGF programs according to the logit esti-
mates when the World Bank variables are excluded+55 IMF and World Bank
arrangements negotiated by preceding governments do not affect crisis probabil-
ity in any specification+ The corresponding marginal effects ~again evaluated at
the mean of all explanatory variables and with the fixed effects set to 0! are 8+4
percent and 7+6 percent for the World Bank ~columns ~1! and ~3!, respectively!
and 17+0 percent for the IMF ~column 2!+56 When we add disbursements to the
regressions, the coefficients are again insignificant, and the results remain
unchanged ~not shown in the table!+ Unsurprisingly, the signaling effect of IMF
and World Bank programs seems to be associated with the existence of the pro-
gram, rather than the size of the loan itself+ Only governments responsible for
the conclusion of the program seem to be punished, while those inheriting a pro-
gram are not+57
54+ Note that about one fourth of both World Bank and IMF programs are inherited programs+
55+ When we include the IMF’s SBA programs and split them into inherited and self-initiated agree-
ments we find both coefficients to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels+ Their inclusion
leaves our findings qualitatively unchanged+
56+ The IV probit estimations yield very similar results that are not included in the table but avail-
able on request+
57+ We also tested for the stability of the IFIs’ effects over time, including a dummy for the post–
Cold War period and interacting this dummy with our IMF and World Bank–related variables+ In none
of the regressions did the interaction term turn out to be significant ~in the nonlinear regressions: at the
mean of the variables!+
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Conclusion
According to our results, structural adjustment arrangements significantly increase
the probability of major government crises+ For the World Bank, this finding does
not depend on the method of estimation, while the impact of the IMF is not robust
to controlling for endogeneity+ We also find that governments face an increased
risk of entering a crisis if they remain under the IFIs’ programs when the econ-
omy performs better+ For the World Bank, this is true for the level of international
reserves and the size of the current account balance; regarding the IMF, inflation
is important+ Finally, only programs concluded by the current government affect
crises, while those inherited by preceding governments do not+ The evidence is
thus in line with a signaling model where IFI programs can be used by voters to
infer the competence of politicians+58
Overall, the significant effects arise for the IFIs’ programs, but not for their dis-
bursements+ Following the interpretation of Boockmann and Dreher, conditionality
and advice seem to be more important than moral hazard due to increased budget-
ary leeway, for example+59 The existence of a program, rather than the size of a loan,
seems to be the signal used by people to gauge the competence of their government+
Our results bear important policy implications+ On average, countries increase
the risk of entering a crisis after turning to the World Bank, but not to the IMF+
For both organizations, the development of the economy over the period of a pro-
gram affects crisis probability+ This insight might help governments in choosing
the right time to exit such programs+ On average, governments can blame the IFIs
for unpopular policies when the economy is experiencing tougher times+ How-
ever, once a recovery is on its way, governments might consider terminating exist-
ing arrangements in order to avoid a crisis+ Consider Bolivia: the government first
agreed to IMF and World Bank programs in 1986, when inflation amounted to 276
percent and reserves covered 5+3 months of imports+ The government remained
under IMF and World Bank programs and a crisis ensued, even though inflation
had fallen to 2+2 percent by the year 2000 and reserves had increased to 6+4 months
of imports+ According to our estimates, the Bolivian government would have ben-
efited from terminating the program when its economic data improved+ Given that
the government itself started the latest arrangements in 1998, voters might have
held the government accountable+ The privatization of water utilities in Cocha-
bamba, for example, was no longer tolerated by large shares of the population and
a major government crisis resulted in 2000+
While our results may entail advice for selfish governments on whether or not
to turn to the IMF and the World Bank, there is still no sharp discrimination between
two alternative hypotheses+ First, instability might increase because program terms
are onerous and damage the economy, thereby creating a situation that damages
58+ Dreher 2004+
59+ Boockmann and Dreher 2003+
Do IMF and World Bank Programs Induce Government Crises? 353
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000094
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:31:09, subject to the Cambridge Core
the government+ Second, crises might occur because the program reveals the poor
quality of government policies+ If the probability of a crisis increases due to pro-
gram conditions that produce negative socioeconomic outcomes, it should not mat-
ter whether a government inherited a program or not+ If we assume that the IMF
and the World Bank do not change conditions when a new government is elected,
our finding that only programs concluded by the current government increase the
probability of crises, while those inherited do not, would point in the direction of
the signaling model+ However, if governments that inherit programs are less likely
to implement program conditions agreed to by their predecessors ~or the IFIs are
less likely to insist on implementation!, the issue remains unresolved+ Further
research incorporating conditionality would be required+60
With the data at hand, we can only speculate on the exact channels that drive our
findings+ Is it the disparate impact of programs on interest groups? The poor design
of structural adjustment policies or negative reactions from financial markets? While
the welfare implications of these alternatives are fundamentally different, they imply
the same unwelcome consequence from the government’s perspective+
A potential avenue for future research could concentrate on modelling the detailed
channels underlying the results of this paper+ On the theory side, we suggest devel-
oping the microfoundations underlying the negative effect of the IFIs’ programs
on government crises further+ More theory is needed on how these programs can
transmit into government crises+ With respect to testing this more fine-grained
theory, we suggest collecting more detailed data on the design of the IFIs’ pro-
grams+ By using data on conditionality and resources invested by the IFIs to pre-
pare and supervise their projects, we would be able to differentiate between the
effects of conditionality and advice+61
TABLE A1. List of variables, definitions, and sources
Variable Definition Source
major government crises Any rapidly developing situation
that threatens to bring the downfall
of the present regime, excluding
situations of revolt aimed at such
overthrow+
Databanks International
~2005!
60+ We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out+
61+ Such data exist but are usually not shared by the IFIs with outside researchers+ For example, the
World Bank collects detailed information on staff preparation and supervision of its projects, and the
conditions included in its programs+ The IMF’s Monitoring of Fund Arrangements ~MONA! database
provides detailed information on IMF conditionality, and compliance with it+ This database has only
been publically available since 2002+ Available at ^www+imf+org0external0np0pdr0mona0index+aspx&,
accessed 2 November 2011+
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TABLE A1. (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
imf saf/prgf program Dummy variable that is 1 if an IMF
program under the Structural
Adjustment Facility or Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility has
been in effect for at least five
months in a certain year, and 0
otherwise+
IMF Annual Reports
imf sba program Dummy variable that is 1 if an IMF
Stand-by Agreement has been in
effect for at least five months in a
certain year, and 0 otherwise+
IMF Annual Reports
world bank programs Variable counting the number of
World Bank programs in effect for
at least five months in a certain
year+ Includes programs given for
structural adjustment, according to
the definition from the World
Bank’s website+
www+worldbank+org
ida disbursements
~share of GDP !
Drawings by the borrower on loan
commitments from the IDA in
current US$ divided by GDP in
current US$+
World Bank, Global
Development Finance
ibrd disbursements
~share of GDP !
Drawings by the borrower on loan
commitments from the IBRD in
current US$ divided by GDP in
current US$+
World Bank, Global
Development Finance
imf saf/prgf disbursements
~share of GDP !
Disbursements of loans and credits
through the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility and IMF Trust
Fund in current US$ divided by
GDP in current US$+
IMF Annual Reports
imf sba disbursements
~share of GDP !
Disbursements of loans and credits
through Stand-by Agreements in
current US$ divided by GDP in
current US$+
IMF Annual Reports
democracy Polity2 score, represents the differ-
ence between a country’s democracy
and autocracy score+ Ranges from
10 to 10 with high numbers indi-
cating higher levels of democracy+
Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers 2010
regime duration The number of years that a political
regime is in place+
Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers 2010
riots Any violent demonstration or clash
of more than 100 citizens involving
the use of physical force+
Databanks International
2005
demonstrations Any peaceful public gathering of at
least 100 people for the primary
purpose of displaying or voicing
their opposition to government
policies or authority, excluding
demonstrations of a distinctly
antiforeign nature+
Databanks International
2005
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TABLE A1. (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
strikes Any strike of 1,000 or more indus-
trial or service workers that involves
more than one employer and that is
aimed at national government poli-
cies or authority+
Databanks International
2005
guerilla warfare Any armed activity, sabotage, or
bombings carried on by
independent bands of citizens or
irregular forces and aimed at the
overthrow of the present regime+
Databanks International
2005
assassinations Any politically motivated murder or
attempted murder of a high
government official or politician+
Databanks International
2005
purges Number of systematic repressions
~or eliminations! by jailing or
execution of political opposition
within the rank of the regime or the
opposition+
Databanks International
2005
economic growth per capita Real GDP growth per capita in
constant ~2000! US$+
World Bank 2006
inflation Inflation, consumer prices ~annual
percent!+
World Bank 2006
international reserves International reserves in months of
imports+
World Bank 2006
avg wb programs in region The average number of World Bank
programs in the same geographic
region ~excluding the respective
country!+
www+worldbank+org
share of countries in
region under imf program
The share of countries which are
under an IMF program in the same
geographic region ~excluding the
respective country!+
Author
current account balance
~share of GDP !
Current account balance in current
US$ divided by GDP in current
US$+
World Bank 2006
TABLE A2. Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
major government crises 4629 0+15 0+48 0 7
crisis dummy 4629 0+11 0+32 0 1
number of world bank programs 5565 0+29 0+73 0 7
imf saf/prgf program 5565 0+10 0+30 0 1
imf sba program 5565 0+13 0+34 0 1
ida disbursements ~share of GDP ! 4605 1+1E-03 1+1E-03 0 0+02
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TABLE A2. (Continued)
Variable Observations Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
ibrd disbursements ~% of GDP ! 4450 1+3E-03 3+6E-03 0 0+08
imf saf/prgf disbursements
~% of GDP !
3446 8+6E-04 4+3E-03 0 0+16
imf sba disbursements
~% of GDP !
4605 1+0E-03 5+5E-03 0 0+20
democracy 4013 1+35 6+95 10 10
regime duration 3899 15+57 17+39 0 105
riots ~log! 4629 0+15 0+43 0 3+30
demonstrations ~log! 4629 0+22 0+51 0 3+30
strikes ~log! 4629 0+07 0+26 0 2+08
guerilla warfare ~log! 4629 0+12 0+30 0 3+56
assassinations ~log! 4629 0+10 0+34 0 3+26
purges ~log! 4629 0+04 0+20 0 2+30
growth per capita ~t1! 4420 1+44 6+77 50+49 89+83
inflation 3542 56+77 562+24 21+68 23773
international reserves 3365 3+47 3+05 0+09 27+08
avg. wb projects in region 5406 0+29 0+30 0 1+33
share of countries in region
under imf program
5406 0+10 0+15 0 0+54
current account balance
~% of GDP !
3181 0+05 0+11 2+40 0+57
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